As we know, Roman ethics was based on virtues. And even today we have so called »values« or »Western values«, which our ethical thinking is based upon.
Let us today consider the virtue of »tolerance« and the question, whether or not it is a virtue at all.
Our English »tolerance« is derived from the Roman virtue of »tolerantia«. However tolerantia had a totally different meaning than today’s tolerance, which refers to respect towards people who think different from us. The Roman virtue of tolerantia meant the ability to go through pain and suffering when the need arose. We see that it is a totally different concept from our modern meaning of tolerance. The Romans had no word for what we mean today by »tolerance«. This concept was perhaps to a certain degree included in the virtue of iustitia that assigned everyone what is his under the motto suum cuique (= to each his own).
A concept for which there is no Latin expression has always caused me to be suspicious about its validity.
So is the modern term of »tolerance« a virtue or not, and what is its value?
The principle purpose of tolerance is apparently avoiding conflict.
If one neighbor enjoys loud music and the other one prefers silence, there are two ways to solve this conflict. One is consideration for the neighbor, which is when both try not to disturb each other. So the one who enjoys loud music lowers the volume to an acceptable level out of consideration for his neighbor. The other way to solve this conflict would be tolerance, which is accepting whatever the neighbor does. In our example the neighbor that actually prefers silence could just tolerate the disturbance.
Both approaches solve the conflict, and there are societies, which use either predominantly the one or predominantly the other. The Roman approach is usually based on rules and regulations, since Romans enjoyed regulating everything. In this case a Roman would follow the concept of consideration and adhere to the laws that regulate the noise that can be produced at a certain time of the day. Of course this problem did not exist in this form in antiquity, because there was no electronic music equipment. But if it had existed, the Roman magistrates had certainly regulated it, because this was the Roman way.
This means Romans were inclined to consideration and mutual respect rather than tolerance.
We can conclude from this that »tolerance« is a possible, but not a necessary virtue in a society. A just society can perfectly work without any tolerance, only based on consideration and respect and regulated by the law.
So how comes that »tolerance« has become such an important virtue, a sine qua non, in our pluralist modern (Or should I say postmodern?) society? Indeed tolerance is essential for postmodern nihilism and moral relativism. If there is no absolute value and all values, cultures and traditions are equal, then none of them must be given any preference. This means other value systems have to be tolerated.
In our example the one neighbor that prefers silence cannot insist that his neighbor lowers the volume, because his habit of listening to loud music is just as valid as the preference for silence. And since silence cannot be actively generated, but is the absence of noise, the only choice that we have under the concept of »tolerance« is playing our own different music style at the same volume.
As already mentioned, such a society based on unregulated »tolerance« can work and therefore is not per se morally wrong.
However there are examples when »tolerance« is not just used as a virtue to solve or avoid conflicts, but as an excuse for morally wrong behavior.
There are two main vices that are usually covered with the excuse of being »tolerant«:
- Cowardice
Since »tolerance« justifies avoiding a possibly violent or otherwise dangerous conflict, one can pretend to be »tolerant« while only being fearful of the confrontation. - Laziness
Since »tolerance« does not require any activity and mostly consists of doing simply nothing, it can be used to justify laziness, when an action would have been required for any virtuous person, exempli gratia when witnessing a crime.
In the last case we have an example where »tolerance« cannot be considered a possible, but not necessary virtue anymore, and this is tolerating a crime. A society that tolerates crimes cannot work anymore. Here is when it becomes a problem.
Summarizing I conclude that »tolerance« is not a necessary virtue, but can be a possible virtue for some societies. However it is dangerous when »tolerance« is extended to crimes against the society or to people who are themselves intolerant. Tolerance towards the intolerant leads to self-contradiction.
It makes therefore no sense to promote »tolerance« as a virtue, even if it can solve conflicts under certain circumstances. The dangerous nature of »tolerance« is therefore the reason why it was not considered to be a virtue in past centuries and was unknown as a concept to the Romans.
A society that promotes »tolerance« has a disadvantage against an intolerant, restrictive society based on »consideration« and preemptive respect. This is why »tolerant« societies have historically not survived.
We should therefore reconsider this value in the Western society.
I know that this is a controversial subject, which is why I did not want to make this post while holding an administrative office in this Collegium.
However now I am free to make controversial posts and I hope to be able to start a discussion with it.
Valete!
C. Florius Lupus
